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Abstract: It seems obvious that when higher-order evidence makes it rational for one to doubt that 
one’s own belief on some matter is rational, this can undermine the rationality of that belief. This is 
known as higher-order defeat. However, despite its intuitive plausibility, it has proved puzzling how 
higher-order defeat works, exactly. To highlight two prominent sources of puzzlement, higher-order 
defeat seems to defy being understood in terms of conditionalization; and higher-order defeat can 
sometimes place agents in what seem like epistemic dilemmas. This chapter draws attention to an 
overlooked aspect of higher-order defeat, namely that it can undermine the resilience of one’s beliefs. 
The notion of resilience was originally devised to understand how one should reflect the ‘weight’ of 
one’s evidence. But it can also be applied to understand how one should reflect one’s higher-order 
evidence. The idea is particularly useful for understanding cases where one’s higher-order evidence 
indicates that one has failed in correctly assessing the evidence, without indicating whether one has 
over- or underestimated the degree of evidential support for a proposition. But it is exactly in such 
cases that the puzzles of higher-order defeat seem most compelling. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
It seems obvious that when higher-order evidence makes it rational for one to doubt that 
one’s own belief or credence on some matter is rational, this in itself can undermine the 
rationality of that belief or credence. For example, evidence that I suffer from the common 
self-enhancement bias undermines the rationality of my belief that I am a better than average 
cook. This phenomenon is known as higher-order defeat. However, despite its intuitive 
plausibility, it has proved puzzling how higher-order defeat works, exactly. To highlight two 
prominent sources of puzzlement, higher-order defeat seems to defy being understood in 
terms of conditionalization, since higher-order evidence does not affect the probability of 
the contents of the beliefs it undermines. And higher-order defeat can place agents in what 
seem like epistemic dilemmas, when the first- and higher-order evidence pull in different 
directions.  
In this chapter, I try to make progress on these issues by drawing attention to an 
overlooked aspect of higher-order defeat, namely that it can undermine the resilience of one’s 
beliefs. This aspect has been noted briefly by Andy Egan and Adam Elga (2005), but has not 
yet received systematic treatment.1 The notion of resilience was originally devised to 
understand how one should reflect the ‘weight’ of one’s evidence in one’s beliefs. But I argue 
that it can also be applied to understand how one should reflect one’s higher-order evidence. 
The idea is particularly useful for understanding cases where one’s higher-order evidence 
indicates that one has failed in correctly assessing the evidence, without indicating in what 
direction one has erred, i.e. whether one has over- or underestimated the degree of support 
for a proposition from one’s evidence. But as I shall argue, it is exactly in such cases that the 
puzzles of higher-order defeat seem most compelling. 
																																																						
1 Roger White (2009) and Alex Worsnip (2014) both discuss the significance of resilience for how to respond 
to epistemic disagreement. However, while they focus on the resilience of one’s estimate of one’s own (and 
one’s interlocutor’s) reliability, and the significance of this for epistemic disagreement, I am interested in the 
impact of higher-order evidence on the resilience of one’s first-order credences. 
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Here is how I will proceed. In §2, I motivate that in some cases, it can be rational to 
maintain one’s level of credence despite rational doubt that the credence is rational. In §3, I 
argue that in such cases, one should respond by lowering the resilience of one’s credence, 
rather than its level, and sketch how the relevant changes in resilience can be understood in 
terms of changes in an agent’s higher-order credences, which are directly constrained by 
one’s higher-order evidence. In §4, I discuss why higher-order doubt undermines credences 
and categorical beliefs in importantly different ways, and how the idea of resilience-defeat 
can explain this. In §5, I show how the proposed account can help resolve the puzzles 
concerning conditionalization and epistemic dilemmas. §6 is a brief summary. 
 
 
2. Rational Credence in the Face of Rational Doubt 
I will begin by considering some cases where it seems rationally permissible for one to 
maintain a certain level of credence in a proposition, even in light of rational doubt that this 
is the right level of credence to hold in one’s epistemic situation. Consider the following case, 
described by David Christensen (2010a: 121): 
Doubtful Ava: “[…] Ava is considering the possibility that (D) the next U.S. 
President will be a Democrat. She gives D some particular credence, say .7; this 
reflects a great deal of her general knowledge, her feel for public opinion, her 
knowledge of possible candidates, etc. But given the possibility that her credence is 
affected by wishful thinking, protective pessimism, or just failure to focus on and 
perfectly integrate an unruly mass of evidence, Ava very much doubts that her 
credence is exactly what her evidence supports.”  
As Christensen notes, it seems ‘eminently reasonable’ for Ava to doubt that her level of 
credence is exactly right, but this in itself doesn’t seem to undermine the rationality of her 
maintaining that level of credence. That is not to say, of course, that Ava’s credence could 
not be irrational for other reasons. Perhaps she really did misinterpret her evidence, thus 
making her credence irrational in light of her first-order evidence alone. But the fact that she 
harbours rational doubt that her credence is rational in light of the evidence, should not in 
itself move her to revise it.  
Similar examples are easy to come by. Consider the following case, inspired by 
Kahneman and Tverski’s famous discussion of the base rate fallacy (1982): 
 
Doubtful Bob: A taxicab has been involved in a hit and run accident at night, and 
Bob has been called to serve on a jury in court, where a driver from Blue Cabs stand 
accused. There are just two taxi companies in town, Green Cabs being the dominant 
one. Only 5% of the taxis in town are blue, 95% are green. A witness saw the incident, 
and identified the cab as blue.  The court tested the reliability of the witness under 
the same circumstances that existed on the night of the accident and concluded that 
the witness correctly identified each one of the two colours 80% of the time, and 
failed 20% of the time. Bob is carefully considering how likely it is that the cab was 
blue rather than green in light of the available evidence, and ends up giving it 
credence .17. However, Bob always found probabilities tricky, and his grasp of Bayes’ 
Rule is pretty hazy. He thus severely doubts that his credence is right given the 
evidence. In fact, he would not be very surprised if he is quite far off the mark. 
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Again, given Bob’s insight into his own imperfect understanding of probabilities, it seems 
reasonable for Bob to doubt the correctness of his credence. But again, this does not seem 
to by itself make it irrational for Bob to maintain this credence. He has considered his 
evidence carefully, applied principles of probabilistic reasoning to the best of his ability, and 
can’t make the result come out any other way. So if his doubt is to have an impact on his 
credence, it is unclear in what direction he should revise it. It therefore doesn’t seem as if his 
doubt by itself should make Bob adopt a different level of credence. 
Not all cases of rational higher-order doubt allow one to maintain one’s credence. 
Indeed, the kind of cases that epistemologists have tended to focus on, do not seem to allow 
this. Immediately after presenting the case I’ve called Doubtful Ava, Christensen goes on to 
present a case of higher-order doubt that clearly does require a revision of credence (2010a: 
121). Here, Brayden, a staunch Republican, also initially gives credence .7 to D, but then 
receives compelling evidence of his own tendency to become irrationally confident of 
unpleasant possibilities, and to never underestimate them. This makes it rational for Brayden 
to believe that his credence is irrationally high, which plausibly means that he should lower 
his credence in D. The difference between this case and Doubtful Ava, Christensen notes, is 
that while Ava’s higher-order evidence of her own fallibility does not ‘lopsidedly’ suggest 
that her credence deviates from what is rational in one particular direction, Brayden’s does. 
Most cases of higher-order defeat discussed in the literature are lopsided in this way. Cases 
of revealed peer-disagreement, for example, where two peers discover that they differ in the 
level of credence they have adopted in response to the same evidence, seem to have this 
property. 
 By contrast, I want to focus, at least initially, on the ‘non-lopsided’ cases, like 
Doubtful Ava and Doubtful Bob. As will become clear, I think that understanding the kind 
of defeat involved in these cases is helpful for understanding higher-order defeat in general. 
The plausibility of such cases does not depend on exactly how much doubt in the correctness 
of their own credence it is rational for Ava and Bob to have. The cases are not very specific 
in this regard, and it seems that a relatively generous range of doubt, from slight to quite 
severe, leaves the intuition that it doesn’t require a revision of credence intact. Ava ‘very 
much doubts’ that her credence is right, yet it is rationally permissible for her to maintain it. 
The same is the case for Bob. This leaves it possible there is an upper limit to how much 
doubt in one’s own credence rationality allows. I will return to that question later. But 
rationality allows at least a relatively high degree of doubt. 
 However, even if Ava and Bob aren’t rationally required to revise their level of 
credence, it seems that their doubt ought to be reflected somehow in their credences. But how? 
The proposal that I want to explore in the following is that while Ava and Bob may maintain 
their level of credence, their credences should become less resilient as a result of their rational 
doubt. I now turn to introduce and motivate that idea. 
 
 
3. Doxastic Resilience and Higher-Order Doubt 
The notion of resilience was originally introduced to explain how evidential weight should be 
reflected in one’s credences. Keynes introduces the notion of evidential weight as follows: 
 
“As the relevant evidence [for a hypothesis] at our disposal increases, the magnitude of [its] probability 
may either decrease or increase, according as the new knowledge strengthens the unfavourable or 
favourable evidence; but something seems to have increased in either case – we have a more substantial 
basis on which to rest our conclusion. […] New evidence will sometimes decrease the probability of 
[the hypothesis] but will always increase its ‘weight’.” (1921: 77).  
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To illustrate this idea, suppose that you have found a coin left behind by a deceased 
cardsharp.2 You have some reason to suspect that the coin is biased, but you are not sure of 
this, and have no idea to what side it is biased, if it is. You can now imagine tossing the coin 
a number of times, and consider what credence you should adopt that the 100th toss will yield 
heads, given various series of prior results. Before tossing the coin at all, you have very little 
information, but the little you have points equally strongly towards heads and tails on the 
100th toss. It thus seems that in that situation, you should adopt credence .5 in heads. Suppose 
now that you have tossed the coin 90 times, and that the results are divided evenly between 
heads and tails. Still, it seems that you should have a credence of .5 in the 100th toss landing 
heads. However, something has obviously changed: you now have a much weightier basis 
for your credence.  
How should this increased weight be reflected in your credence, if not in its level? 
One plausible answer is that it should be reflected in what Brian Skyrms (1977) and others 
have called its degree of ‘resilience’, which can be understood as measuring how much the 
level of credence should change in the face of additional data. Imagine, for example, that we 
add a series of five heads to the two evidential situations above. Adding this series to the 
situation where you have you haven’t yet observed a single toss should clearly have a large 
impact on your credence that the 100th toss will land heads. You should move from .5 to 
something much closer to 1. But adding it to the situation where you have already observed 
90 tosses should make a relatively modest impact. Your level of credence in this latter 
situation is thus much more resilient than in the first.3 
 Although the idea of resilience was originally introduced to explain how one should 
reflect the weight of one’s evidence, it seems that other factors besides weight should have 
a similar effect. Egan and Elga (2005: 77-79) observe that when one’s credence is based on 
how reliable one takes some channel of information to be, changes in this reliability should 
be reflected not only in the level of one’s credence, but also in its resilience. Suppose that 
you seem to remember that the person across the room is called Sarah. If you rationally 
regard your memory for names as 99% reliable, you should adopt a credence of .99 that the 
person’s name is indeed Sarah. If it becomes rational for you to regard your memory as less 
reliable, you should adjust your credence in its deliverances accordingly. For example, were 
you to become rationally convinced that your memory is only 90% reliable, your credence 
should be .9, etc. But this reduction of trust in your own memory should have a further 
effect: it should make your memory-based credences less resilient. To show this, Egan and 
Elga consider what would happen if you overheard someone else calling the person across 
the room ‘Kate’ instead of ‘Sarah’, and you rationally regard this person as 95% reliable in 
remembering names. In the situation where you regard yourself as 99% reliable, this 
experience should make you adjust your credence only moderately, to .84. But in the situation 
where you regard yourself as 90% reliable, the reduction you should make is rather drastic, 
namely to .32.4 So reduced trust in your channel of information should affect both your level 
of credence, and the sensitivity of this credence to new information, i.e. its resilience. 
 This indicates that resilience is a property that should be affected by several different 
factors, evidential weight and reliability of one’s informational source being two examples. I 
now want to argue that changes in rational doubt about the correctness of one’s level of 
credence in light of the evidence, should have a similar effect on the resilience of one’s 
																																																						
2 This example originates in Popper’s discussion of the paradox of ideal evidence (1972); this particular 
version is inspired by one found in Hansson (2008). 
3 For a helpful discussion of the impact of evidential weight on doxastic resilience, see Joyce (2005). 
4 As they note, this assumes that independently of your memory impressions, you regard the two names as 
being equally likely to be correct (2005: 78). 
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credence. To give some initial motivation for this idea, consider the following variation of 
Doubtful Ava: 
Confident Eve: Eve is considering the possibility that (D) the next U.S. President 
will be a Democrat. She gives D some particular credence, say .7; this reflects a great 
deal of her general knowledge, her feel for public opinion, her knowledge of possible 
candidates, etc. As Eve is well aware, she is even-minded and very experienced in 
integrating unruly bodies of evidence, and she is therefore rationally highly confident 
that her level of credence reflects what her evidence supports.  
 
While it seems rationally permissible for both Ava and Eve to maintain credence .7 in D, it 
seems plausible that Ava’s credence should be less resilient than Eve’s in the light of new 
evidence that they might receive. Suppose, for example, that Ava and Eve both receive some 
new evidence which clearly speaks against D, but not decisively so, namely that a heightened 
threat of terrorist attacks has moved some voters to prefer a more hawkish national security 
policy, traditionally associated with the Republicans. For simplicity we can assume that both 
Ava and Eve correctly understand the significance of this new evidence, and that they are 
both rationally confident of what this is. How should their level of credence in D change 
once they add the new evidence?  
Here it seems plausible that Doubtful Ava should move to a lower credence than 
Confident Eve. Ava, after all, was unsure, and was reasonable to be unsure, that she was 
correct in taking the original evidence to speak in favour of D as much as her credence 
reflected. So when she becomes rationally convinced that the new evidence speaks against 
D, this should pull her a fair bit in the other direction. Eve, on the other hand, was rationally 
convinced that she was correct in taking the old evidence to support her credence, so she 
can place more weight on the old evidence when taking the new evidence into account.  
A similar verdict seems plausible if we compare Doubtful Bob to a more confident 
juror, Bill:   
Confident Bill: A taxicab has been involved in a hit and run accident at night, and 
Bill has been called to serve on a jury in court, where a driver from Blue Cabs stand 
accused. There are just two taxi companies in town, Green Cabs being the dominant 
one. Only 5% of the taxis in town are blue, 95% are green. A witness saw the incident, 
and identified the cab as blue.  The court tested the reliability of the witness under 
the same circumstances that existed on the night of the accident and concluded that 
the witness correctly identified each one of the two colours 80% of the time, and 
failed 20% of the time. Bill is carefully considering how likely it is that the cab was 
blue rather than green in light of the available evidence, and ends up giving it 
credence .17. Bill always loved probability puzzles, and is a long time student of 
Bayesian reasoning. He is thus rationally very confident that his credence is right 
given the evidence. 
Again, although their different levels of rational doubt allow both Bob and Bill to maintain 
the same level of credence, it seems plausible that their credence should differ in sensitivity 
to new evidence. Suppose that the prosecutor introduces a new piece of evidence: a blue 
paint trace from the crime scene. The paint is of a common kind, and it cannot be dated with 
accuracy, so the new evidence is not conclusive. But it certainly does support to some degree 
that the guilty cab was blue. Suppose that both Bob and Bill become rationally convinced of 
the significance of this new evidence. How should they react? It seems plausible that Bob 
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should revise his credence more than Bill should. Prior to receiving the new evidence, they 
both had a relatively low credence that the cab was blue, but only Bill was rationally confident 
that this low credence adequately reflected his evidence. Bill should thus place more weight 
on this prior evidence, than Bob should, and thus be moved less in the direction suggested 
by the new evidence. 
In these examples, the difference in resilience showed up in how much the relevant 
credences should be affected by new evidence bearing directly on the object-level 
proposition, i.e. that the next president will be a Democrat, and that the cab at the crime 
scene was blue. But it seems that there should be a similar difference in resilience in the face 
of new higher-order evidence, for example in the form of revealed disagreement. Suppose, 
for example, that Ava and Eve both meet another person, Adam, that after careful 
consideration of their evidence judges it to support a credence in D of .3. Insofar as Ava and 
Eve place at least some confidence in Adam’s ability to assess the evidence, they should both 
reduce their level of credence to some degree. But again, it seems that Ava should move her 
credence more than Eve in the direction of Adam’s. So the lower resilience of Ava’s credence 
should manifest itself in sensitivity to new evidence of both first- and higher-order (more on 
such cases below). 
Obviously, if differences in how rationally confident we should be in our own 
assessments of the evidence make a difference to how resilient our credences ought to be, 
higher-order evidence bearing directly on how confident we should be in our own 
assessments will normatively constrain the resilience of our credences. If Doubtful Ava 
acquires compelling evidence that she is actually less prone to bias and wishful thinking than 
she thought, she should become more confident in her assessment of the evidence, and her 
credence should thus become more resilient. And if Confident Eve acquires compelling 
evidence that she is actually more prone to bias and wishful thinking than she thought, she 
should lower her confidence in her own assessment of the evidence, and her credence should 
thus become correspondingly less resilient. If we think of higher-order evidence as evidence 
that concerns how rationally one has responded to one’s first-order evidence, this suggest a 
new normative role for higher-order evidence, namely as something that should affect the 
resilience of one’s credences. More specifically, our higher-order evidence constrains how 
confident we ought to be that our first-order credences correctly reflect our evidence. It 
constrains, in other words, one’s ‘higher-order credences’ about the correctness of one’s 
first-order credences. And how confident we ought to be that our first-order credences 
correctly reflect our evidence in turn constrains how resilient those first-order credences 
ought to be.  
How exactly do rational higher-order credences constrain the resilience of the first-
order credences they take as their object? This can be seen by reflecting further on cases of 
epistemic disagreement.5 As mentioned above, the resilience of a first-order credence that p 
can be a matter of sensitivity to both first-order evidence bearing directly on p, and higher-
order evidence indicating that a level of credence different from one’s own better reflects the 
first-order evidence.  
Begin with the latter kind, i.e. sensitivity of a first-order credence in p to new higher-
order evidence concerning the correctness of that credence. This sort of case is familiar from 
the literature on epistemic disagreement. Suppose that you have adopted some particular 
level of credence in response to some evidence, and then meet someone who has adopted a 
different level of credence in response to the same evidence. You thus disagree about what 
																																																						
5 I assume here a broadly conciliatory approach to disagreement, such as that defended by e.g. Christensen 
(2007). For a precise probabilistic account of how peer-disagreement can be understood in terms of higher-
order evidence, see Rasmussen et al. (2018). 
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credence your shared evidence supports. How should you react? That depends on how 
reliable it is rational for you to regard yourself and your friend as in assessing the evidence, 
i.e. how likely you are rational to think it is for each of you to have assessed the evidence 
correctly. Other things being equal, the more likely it is for you that you have evaluated the 
evidence correctly, the less you should revise your credence in the direction of your friend’s, 
and vice versa. So rational higher-order credences about how well your first-order credences 
reflect your evidence affect how sensitive those credences should be to new higher-order 
evidence, i.e. their resilience in the face of such evidence. 
But how can sensitivity to new first-order evidence bearing directly on the object-
level proposition be understood in terms of higher-order credences? Again, cases of 
disagreement provide a useful model, although this time it requires taking a step back. 
Philosophers have tended to focus on cases where the disagreeing parties have responded 
differently to the same shared body of evidence, but it seems that parties to a disagreement 
should respond in more or less the same way if their evidence isn’t identical, but merely on 
par. Christensen (2007) considers a case where I have good reason to believe that my friend’s 
evidence with respect to p, although different from mine, is just as good. But whereas his 
evidence supports his credence in p of .2, my evidence supports my credence of .8. For 
simplicity, let us assume that the two bodies of evidence are on par with respect to evidential 
weight. The effect on resilience generated by weight should thus be the same for both bodies 
of evidence. As Christensen observes, it seems that even if we have responded to different 
bodies of evidence, we should both revise our credences in the direction of the other.  
Furthermore, in such cases, changes in cognitive parity should affect what the 
disagreeing parties should do, in the same way as in cases where the parties have the same 
evidence. If I discover that I am in fact my peer’s cognitive superior, I should revise less in 
his direction, and vice versa, even if we have responded to different bodies of evidence. In 
fact, this seems to hold even when the evidence possessed by the disagreeing parties is not 
only non-identical, but also not on a par. When my evidence with respect to p is better than 
my disagreeing friend’s evidence, I have some reason in virtue of that to favour my own level 
of credence in p over my friend’s. But I still cannot completely disregard my friend’s 
assessment of his evidence, and should thus revise in his direction, albeit less so than if his 
evidence had been as good as mine. Conversely, when my friend’s evidence is better than 
mine, I have reason to favour his level of credence, but needn’t completely disregard my 
own. And again, even in situations such as these, changes in cognitive parity should matter 
to how much I should revise. Even in cases where my evidence is better or worse than my 
friend’s, I should revise less if I discover that I am his cognitive superior, and more if I 
discover that he is cognitively superior to me. 
With this in mind, return now to the question of sensitivity to new first-order 
evidence. Suppose that I have adopted credence .8 in p in response to one body of evidence 
E1, and that I rationally regard myself as highly reliable in evaluating E1. I now get some 
new evidence bearing on p, E2, which is on a par with E1 in terms of evidential weight. 
Again, I rationally regard myself as highly reliable in evaluating E2, and judge that this 
evidence, in isolation, supports a credence of .2 in p. What credence in p should I adopt in 
light of my total evidence? The conflicting bodies of evidence are on a par, and I rationally 
regard myself as equally reliable in evaluating both. So it seems that by reasoning parallel to 
that used in cases of epistemic disagreement, I should adopt a credence roughly in the middle, 
i.e. .5.6 
																																																						
6 This assumes, of course, that the two bodies of evidence are independent, and that there are no 
undercutting defeating relations between them. 
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But what if I rationally regard myself as being less reliable in evaluating E1 than E2, 
perhaps because of the mathematics involved in that body of evidence, and thus rationally 
regard it as less likely that I have evaluated E1 correctly than E2? I would then seem to find 
myself in a situation parallel to the case of disagreement with evidential parity but cognitive 
non-parity. In that case, I should thus adopt a credence closer to that which I judge to be 
supported by E2 alone, than that which I judge to be supported by E1 alone. On the other 
hand, if I rationally regard myself as more reliable in evaluating E1 than E2, I should end up 
with a credence to closer to that which I judge to be supported by E1 alone. Again, as in the 
case of disagreement, this can be generalised beyond cases with parity between conflicting 
bodies of evidence. Regardless of whether E1 and E2 are on a par as evidential bodies, ceteris 
paribus I should end up with a credence closer to, or farther from, that which I judge to be 
supported by E1 alone, depending on how reliable I rationally think I am at correctly 
assessing the import of E1. 
So it seems that cases of epistemic disagreement with non-identical evidence 
provides a model for how to understand the resilience of first-order credences in the face of 
new object-level evidence, in a way that relies on rational higher-order credences about one’s 
reliability in assessing the respective bodies of evidence. The resilience of a first-order 
credence in the face of new first-order evidence is affected by how reliable one regards 
oneself as being in assessing the new and old evidence, in roughly the same way as the 
sensitivity of one’s credence in cases of disagreement depends on how reliable one thinks 
that oneself and the disagreeing friend are.  
The resulting picture is that higher-order evidence of one’s own rational failure 
undermines the resilience of one’s first-order credences, by undermining how likely it is 
rational for one to think that those credences correctly reflect the evidence on which they 
are based. This in turn makes those credences more sensitive to both higher-order evidence 
that a different credence level is correct, as in cases of disagreement, and to new first-order 
evidence supporting a different credence level; in other words, it makes those credences less 
resilient. 
So far, I have focused on cases of higher-order defeat which allows one to maintain 
one’s level of credence. I have argued that in such cases, the defeat should be understood as 
undermining the resilience of one’s credence, instead of its level. But not all cases of higher-
order defeat are like that. In some cases, the evidence not only lowers the probability that 
one’s credence correctly reflects the evidence, but also ‘lopsidedly’ indicates in what direction 
one has erred. This is the case in Christensen’s example of Brayden the Republican, and in 
cases of epistemic disagreement. 
Both kinds of higher-order defeat can be understood in terms of the effect they have 
on one’s higher-order credences about what first-order credence best reflects the evidence. 
In lopsided cases, the higher-order evidence makes it more likely for one that another 
credence is correct in light of one’s evidence, which means that one must revise one’s level 
of credence. How much one should revise depends on how probable it is for one that one’s 
original level of credence was correct, as well as how probable the higher-order evidence 
makes it that another level is correct.7 In non-lopsided cases, defeating higher-order evidence 
makes it less likely for one that one’s credence is right in light of one’s first-order evidence, 
but does not make another level of credence more likely to be correct than the original one. 
It ‘spreads out’ or ‘flattens’ one’s higher-order probability distribution, without pulling its 
highest point in a particular direction. This means that what’s defeated is not the level of 
one’s first-order credence, but only its resilience. In general, then, higher-order defeat works 
																																																						
7 For a detailed account of this, see Rasmussen et al. (2018). 
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by affecting one’s higher-order probabilities, but only in some cases does this require a 
change in credence. 
 
 
4. Resilience Defeat and Categorical Belief 
In my discussion so far, I have focused on the effects of higher-order doubt and evidence 
on credences or graded beliefs. One might reasonably wonder how well the above account 
applies to categorical beliefs. On the face of it, it may seem as if rather little applies. Consider 
the kind of cases where it seemed plausible that some particular level of credence in a 
proposition could be rationally combined with a fairly high degree of doubt that this level of 
credence was correct in light of the evidence. Could similar cases be thought of involving 
categorical beliefs? That is, could it be rational to believe that p outright while harbouring a 
high degree of rational doubt that it is rational or justified to believe that p in light of one’s 
evidence? That seems much less plausible. It may well be possible to rationally believe that 
p while having some relatively low degree of rational doubt about this belief, but the room 
for this seems much more limited. This difference ought to strike us as puzzling. Both 
credences and categorical beliefs must be based on adequate evidence in order to be rational 
or justified. So why can it be rationally permissible to maintain a credence in the face of 
rational doubt about its rationality, when this isn’t permissible with categorical beliefs? 
In addition to being a puzzling difference in itself, something that we ought to try to 
explain, the difference might also be seen to undermine the picture that I have proposed of 
higher-order defeat. This is because there is usually thought to be a tight connection between 
one’s beliefs and credences. On one popular account of the relation, categorical belief simply 
is a suitably high degree of credence.8 The picture suggested above allows one to maintain 
one’s credences in the face of rational doubt about those very credences. So if categorical 
belief is simply a high degree of credence, my proposal would implausibly allow categorical 
belief in the face of higher-order doubts too.9  
Fortunately, there is a plausible alternative theory of the relation between credence 
and categorical belief that allows my account to both explain the puzzling difference, and 
defuse the challenge it threatens to raise. This is the ‘stability theory’ of belief, developed in 
recent writings by Hannes Leitgeb (2014; 2015; 2017), and attributed by him and others to 
David Hume, as an early proponent.10 According to the stability theory, a high credence in p 
is necessary but not sufficient for belief that p. In order to count as a belief, the high credence 
must also be suitably ‘stable,’ which enables belief to “play its characteristic functional role 
in decision-making, reasoning, and asserting […] in the course of processes such as 
perception, supposition and communication” (Leitgeb 2015: 146). Leitgeb understands the 
stability of a credence as a matter of the credence being preserved under conditionalization, 
that is, under the supposition of new evidence or information (2015: 156). In other words, 
stability is a matter of resilience, in roughly the same sense as I have used that term above. 
																																																						
8 This is what Richard Foley identifies as the ’Lockean Thesis’ (1993, Ch.4). For further discussion of this and 
other accounts of the relation between credence and categorical belief, see Keith Frankish (2009). 
9 The tension between the present theory of higher-order defeat and the Lockean thesis may be less severe 
than this suggests, for two reasons. First, if categorical belief requires a high degree of credence, it may be 
hard to find realistic cases where resilience is lowered dramatically while leaving the credence level intact or 
above the level required for belief. This is because rational doubt that a high credence level is correct leaves 
more room for error in the ‘too high’ direction than in the ‘too low’ direction. Second, in some cases where it 
is rational for to doubt that one’s credence level is correct, the margin of error may be too small to reach 
below the threshold for belief. I am grateful to David Christensen for pointing this out to me. 
10 For this interpretation of Hume’s account of belief, see in particular Louis Loeb (2002). For Hume’s own 
presentation, see his (1739-40: Bk. I, Pt. III, § 7). 
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I will not specify or motivate the stability theory of belief further here.11 What 
interests me is how the theory combines with the above theory of higher-order defeat. The 
difference between high credence and categorical belief implies that the two states are subject 
to different rationality constraints. While it can be rational to have a high credence without 
it being rational for this credence to be very resilient, the rationality of categorical belief 
requires the rationality of both a high credence and a high degree of resilience. This is what 
explains why a high credence in a proposition is rationally compatible with a high degree of 
rational doubt in that credence being correct, while this is not possible for categorical belief. 
A high degree of rational doubt about the correctness of one’s own credence would exclude 
the rationality of the credence being sufficiently stable, and would thereby exclude the 
rationality of what is necessary for outright belief, namely stable high credence. This also 
defuses the challenge raised by the puzzling difference between credences and beliefs, for 
my account of higher-order defeat. Indeed, if rational belief requires rational stability, while 
rational high credence does not, and higher-order evidence sometimes undermines rational 
stability without undermining a high degree of credence, we should expect this apparently 
puzzling difference. Rather than undermining it, the difference between credences and 
beliefs in sensitivity to higher-order doubt thus becomes a point in favour of the proposed 
account. 
 
5. Applications 
Thinking of higher-order evidence and defeat as something that undermines the resilience 
of one’s first-order credences can help explain a number of puzzling features of higher-order 
evidence and defeat. Here, I want to focus on two such puzzling features, concerning (i) 
belief revision by conditionalization, and (ii) how one should respond to misleading higher-
order evidence.  
 
5.1 Higher-Order Evidence and Conditionalization 
The first problematic feature of higher-order evidence is, in short, that it seems to give rise 
to mismatches between the level of confidence one should adopt in a proposition on the 
supposition that one acquires certain evidence, and the confidence on should adopt in the 
proposition if one actually acquires that evidence. Consider the following example adapted 
from Christensen (2010b).  
A scientist is contemplating the confirmation that some currently unrealised 
experimental result E would provide for a hypothesis H, and judges correctly that it would 
provide a high degree of confirmation. He thus regards it as highly probable that H is true 
on the supposition that E. This makes him judge that if he actually learns that E, he should 
become highly confident that H is true. However, the scientist also considers how probable 
H would be on the supposition of E along with a further factor D: that he has been given a 
powerful reason-distorting drug prior to assessing his experimental results. Reasonably, the 
scientist realises that this addition should have no effect whatsoever on the probability of H. 
E confirms H to the same degree, whether or not he, or anyone else for that matter, happens 
to be unable to rationally assess this. So he regards it as highly probable that H is true on the 
supposition of E&D. But here’s the catch: even though the scientist is convinced of this 
conditional probability, he should not resolve to become highly confident that H is true if 
he actually learns E&D. In fact, if he were to learn E&D, he should not be very confident 
																																																						
11 I see no reason to suppose that the stability theory is incompatible with the teleological account of belief 
that I have defended elsewhere (e.g. 2006; 2009). 
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of H at all. So we now appear to have a puzzling mismatch between the scientist’s prior 
conditional probability, and how confident he should become upon acquiring the evidence, 
thus contradicting the standard updating model. 
 By understanding higher-order defeat as something that, at least in non-lopsided 
cases, undermines the resilience of a credence, rather than its level, we can uphold the 
standard updating model. Suppose that the scientist assesses the prior probability of H given 
E to be .9. If he were to learn E, he should thus adopt credence .9 in H. As we have supposed, 
the scientist ascribes an identical probability to H given E&D. He should thus also adopt 
credence .9 in H if he were to learn E&D. But if he were to learn E&D, he should become 
much less confident that .9 is the right level of credence. As we have already seen, this is not 
necessarily irrational. Having a particular level of credence can be rationally combined with 
a high degree of doubt in that level being correct. This, however, should make the credence 
less resilient, i.e. more susceptible to being revised in the face of new evidence. The higher-
order evidence is thus allowed to make its mark on the scientist’s credence without giving up 
conditionalization. 
If we understand the reduced confidence in one’s credence being correct in terms of 
higher-order credences, we can understand that too in terms of conditionalization. But what 
is the relevant prior conditional probability? As we have already seen, D does not affect the 
probability of H. Does D somehow affect the prior conditional probability of H given E? 
That is, does the fact that the scientist is drugged somehow affect how probable the 
hypothesis is in light of the experimental result, for example by making it less likely that that 
conditional probability is of a certain level? Again, the answer is clearly no. But something 
that D clearly does affect, is the probability of the scientist correctly assessing the support 
for H given by E. More specifically, the scientist should regard it as less probable that the 
assessment he reaches of H given E is correct on the supposition of D, compared to the 
probability of that on the supposition of not-D.  
So now we can explain both the credence in H that the scientist should adopt, and 
the low resilience that credence should have, in terms of conditionalization. Consider first 
the scientist’s credence towards H. Prior to receiving the experimental result E, he holds the 
probability of H given E to be .9. He also holds the probability of H given E&D to be .9. So 
when he learns E&D he should adopt credence .9 in H. So how does learning D impact his 
credence? Call the proposition that the scientist will correctly assess the support for H given 
by E ‘C’. Prior to learning D, the scientist ascribes some relatively low probability to C given 
D, say .3. So, when the scientist learns that D, he rationally adopts credence .3 in C, which, 
given his actual assessment of H given E, amounts to having a credence of .3 that his 
credence of .9 in H is correct. As long as he regards a credence of .9 in H as being more 
likely to be correct than any other level of credence, this can be a rational combination of 
credences. It just means that his credence is H should not be very resilient. The result is that 
the scientist has revised by conditionalization in response to both E and D, without letting 
D affect the probability of H, while allowing D to make its mark on the credence in H by 
reducing its resilience. 
Here’s a possible objection. Above I characterised the problem as that of explaining 
the mismatch between how probable one should regard a proposition on the supposition of 
some evidence, and the ‘level of confidence’ one should adopt in the proposition if one 
actually acquires that evidence. But does the above really explain that? After all, if we by ‘level 
of confidence’ mean level of credence, my proposal does not deliver this result. Indeed, on 
my proposal, one’s posterior credence should match the prior conditional probability. 
However, I think that the intuition that one should become less ‘confident’ upon acquiring 
the higher-order evidence trades on an ambiguity in that notion. Having a high credence in 
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a proposition is the typical understanding of what it means to be highly confident in that 
proposition. But if one is highly unsure about one’s level of credence being right, thus making 
the credence easy to affect by new evidence, it seems wrong to characterise having such a 
credence in a proposition as being ‘highly confident’ that the proposition is true, even if the 
level of credence is high. If so, my proposal does deliver the correct verdict. 
What about lopsided cases? If the challenge to the standard updating model persists 
for such cases, the above solution might not be much of a solution at all. For example, 
suppose that the reason-distorting drug is designed specifically to dispose people to 
overestimate the evidence and adopt a higher credence than the evidence actually warrants. 
Surely, learning that one has been given such a drug should lead one to reduce one’s level of 
credence. Yet, shouldn’t one’s prior conditional probability of H given E&D still match that 
of H given E alone? After all, whether one has been drugged has no bearing on the actual 
evidential bearing on E for H. If so, the mismatch between the prior conditional probability 
and the credence one should adopt upon acquiring the evidence seems to persist. 
However, it is not obvious to me that one’s prior conditional probability of H given 
E&D should be the same as that of H given E in lopsided cases. Consider the following 
lopsided case, where this seems particularly dubious. Instead of considering the probability 
of H given the experiment and being drugged, the scientist now considers the probability of 
H given the experiment and being told by his colleague Stephen Hawking that the probability 
of H given E is .1, and not .9 as the scientist is independently inclined to judge. If learning 
this, the scientist should clearly adopt a credence a fair bit below .9. But it seems equally clear 
that his prior conditional probability given this should be below .9 as well, thus retaining the 
match between the two probabilities. The scientist should clearly not be very confident that 
if he were to learn of the experiment and of Stephen Hawking’s testimony, then H would be 
true, despite his actual confidence in the support for H provided by E. But why think, then, 
that above case with the overestimation-drug is any different? After all, Stephen Hawking’s 
testimony is also evidence that the scientist’s initial judgment overestimates the evidential 
import of the experiment.  
This suggests that what’s driving the intuition in Christensen’s original case of the 
reason distorting drug is that in that case, the drug is not stipulated to have a lopsided effect. 
It is this fact that makes it plausible that having taken the drug doesn’t affect the conditional 
probability of H given E, while at the same time requiring a lowered confidence upon 
learning that one has taken it. But as argued above, this lowered confidence can be 
understood in terms of resilience, rather than credence level. If this is plausible, neither 
lopsided nor non-lopsided cases exhibit mismatches between the prior conditional 
probability, and the level of credence one should adopt upon acquiring the evidence.  
 
5.2 Misleading Higher-Order Evidence and Akrasia 
Another major source of interest in the nature of higher-order evidence stems from cases 
where it appears to undermine the otherwise highly plausible idea that it cannot be rational 
to hold a belief that one believes to be irrational, i.e. that epistemic akrasia is always irrational. 
Despite the intuitive appeal of this, a number of authors have argued that in situations with 
sufficiently compelling misleading higher-order evidence, it can in fact be rational to hold an 
akratic combination of beliefs. For those who want to resist that conclusion, the challenge is 
to explain why akratic combinations of beliefs are not the correct way to reflect one’s 
evidence, but this has proven difficult. In this final section, I argue that resilience offers an 
attractive explanation. 
 I will focus on a case of apparently rational epistemic akrasia developed by Allen 
Coates (2012), in which it is especially clear how resilience helps resolve the problem: 
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“Watson is an apprentice of Holmes, a master sleuth. As part of his training, Watson will often 
accompany Holmes to crime scenes and other locations, size up the evidence as best he can, and tell 
Holmes what conclusion he has drawn, and how he has drawn it. Holmes will then assess Watson’s 
conclusion as rational or irrational, though not as true or false. Of course, this assessment is based in 
part on whether Holmes thinks the evidence supports the conclusion. But just as a logic student may 
use invalid steps to arrive at a conclusion that follows validly from the premises, so too Watson may 
use poor reasoning to arrive at a conclusion that is nevertheless supported by the evidence. In such a 
case, Watson would be irrational in holding his conclusion, and Holmes will assess it accordingly. 
Thus, it is possible for Holmes to arrive at the same conclusion from the same evidence as Watson, 
and still claim that Watson’s belief is irrational. Watson is aware of this, and so he cannot infer from 
such a claim that Holmes thinks his conclusion is false. In fact, he cannot even infer that Holmes 
thinks that the evidence does not support his conclusion. All he can infer is that Holmes thinks that 
he has arrived at his conclusion irrationally. This is by design: Watson is to consider the evidence on 
his own until he arrives at a conclusion rationally, and his knowing Holmes’ own conclusion would 
interfere with this. Now suppose that Holmes brings Watson to a crime scene, that the evidence 
indicates that the butler is guilty, and that Watson uses good reasoning to arrive at that conclusion. In 
short, Watson rationally believes that the butler did it. But when he tells Holmes of his conclusion 
and how he arrived at it, Holmes only response it, ‘Your conclusion is irrational.’ Since Holmes is a 
master sleuth, Watson is justified in believing Holmes to be correct: Holmes’s testimony on these 
matters is very authoritative. But authoritative though he is, he is not infallible, and this is one of the 
rare occasions in which he is wrong. So when Watson accepts Holmes’s assessment, he accepts a 
falsehood. Watson, then, may reasonably but wrongly judge that his conclusion is irrational. 
Therefore, if he nevertheless maintains his belief in the butler’s guilt, both it and his epistemic 
judgment of it are rational. Yet, in holding them both, he is akratic.” (Coates 2012: 114) 
 
Since both of Watson’s beliefs are rational in light of his evidence, this seems like a prima facie 
case of rational epistemic akrasia. And several authors do in fact accept this possibility, 
Coates included.12 This, however, is highly counterintuitive, and leads to other problems 
concerning how one should reason from the akratic beliefs, what actions they rationalise, 
and more.13 But the alternatives to allowing rational akrasia are problematic as well. If Watson 
adopts the ‘steadfast’ approach, as some philosophers recommend, and believes that the 
butler did it and that his evidence supports this, Watson fails to acknowledge his higher-
order evidence. But if Watson instead adopts the ‘conciliatory’ approach recommended by 
others, and becomes less confident that the butler did it and that his evidence supports this, 
he will fail to acknowledge his first-order evidence. So either way, Watson will fail to respect 
some of his evidence.14 
How does resilience help us understand cases such as this? A crucial feature of the 
above case is that Holmes’s testimony isn’t evidence of the butler’s innocence. Holmes may 
judge Watson’s belief to be irrational, even if he thinks that it is true. As Coates observes, 
without this feature it would clearly not be rational of Watson to continue to believe in the 
butler’s guilt. The significance of this becomes clear when we consider Watson’s beliefs in 
terms of the underlying credences. Suppose that the evidence at the crime scene supports 
believing that the butler did it partly in virtue of supporting a credence in this above the 
threshold for categorical belief. After correctly assessing the evidence, Watson thus adopts 
the belief that the butler did it, partly in virtue of adopting a high credence in the butler’s 
guilt. When Watson hears Holmes’s testimony, this makes it rational for Watson to believe 
that his belief in the butler’s guilt is irrational. Again, it is natural to interpret this in terms of 
																																																						
12 For other defenders, see e.g. Wedgwood (2012), Lasonen-Arnio (2014), and Williamson (2014). 
13 For criticism, see e.g. Horowitz (2014). 
14 For the ’steadfast’ approach to misleading higher-order evidence, see e.g. Titelbaum (2015). For the 
’conciliatory’ approach, see e.g. Feldman (2005), Christensen (2010b), and Horowitz (2014). 
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credence, namely as the belief that his high credence in the butler’s guilt is irrational. But 
since Holmes’s testimony isn’t evidence of the butler’s innocence, it doesn’t by itself support 
moving to a lower credence in the butler’s guilt. Recall that as the case is set up, Watson’s 
credence may be correct in light of the evidence, even if it is irrational. This makes it plausible 
that Watson may maintain his high credence, even after hearing Holmes’s testimony. 
However, Watson’s belief that his high credence is irrational should have the effect of 
lowering the resilience of that credence. It should dispose him to revise his credence more 
readily in light of new first-order evidence about the culprit, and in light of new higher-order 
evidence that, contrary to Holmes’s testimony, does suggest that a different level of credence 
is correct. But in that case, Watson’s credence will no longer qualify as a categorical belief, 
since this requires a certain level of resilience (assuming the stability theory of belief).  
In this way, Watson can respect both his first- and higher-order evidence, without it 
being akratic. His first-order evidence is correctly reflected in his high credence in the butler’s 
guilt. His higher-order evidence is correctly reflected in his low confidence in his own 
credence being rational in light of the evidence, and in the correspondingly low resilience of 
that credence. And it is not a case of akrasia because, while believing p is rationally 
incompatible with believing that believing p is irrational, it is not necessarily irrational to hold 
some level of credence while being doubtful that that level is rational. If Watson responds 
to his evidence as he ought to do, he is therefore not epistemically akratic. 
 As in the discussion of conditionalization, this solution faces the potential objection 
that, while it may work in cases where the higher-order evidence doesn’t suggest that a 
different credence level is correct, it doesn’t work when this condition isn’t met, i.e. in 
lopsided cases. But it is far from clear that such cases are problematic to begin with. Coates 
clearly thinks that his verdict that Watson’s akratic beliefs are rational depends on Watson 
not being able to infer from Holmes’s testimony that the butler is innocent. Had he been 
able to infer this, his belief that the butler is guilty would not be rational, and hence there 
wouldn’t be a puzzling case of rational akrasia. At least some other cases of supposedly 
rational epistemic akrasia in the literature appear to be non-lopsided in this way as well.15 But 
I shall have to leave detailed discussion of this objection for another occasion. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
I have argued that higher-order defeat should sometimes be understood as undermining the 
resilience of one’s credences rather than their level. I showed how this integrates with a 
general picture of higher-order evidence as something that constrains one’s higher-order 
credences, and outlined how the proposal helps explain two puzzling features of higher-
order defeat. Obviously much more can and must be said to develop and motivate this 
account. But I hope to have showed that the account is sufficiently promising to warrant 
further work. 
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15 For example, Wedgwood (2012) discusses higher-order evidence pointing to one’s own irrationality or 
incompetence, but not evidence supporting that a different inference or conclusion is in fact correct. 
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